themselves, but shape is a feature of those things. If I see a cube in normal conditions and rightly judge that it is a cube, then by gum there really is a mind-independent cubical thing out there, the shape of which in some important way resembles my experience of its shape. If
Immanuel Kant (1781 Kant ( /1787 Kant ( /1929 ) is right, then John Locke is wrong about this. Things in themselves aren't cubical -or at least we have no good reason to think they are cubical. They're not laid out in space. There's nothing independent of the human mind that has cubical properties that resemble the properties of my visual experience of cubes. Or is this just a sheen, a convenient interface experience, a human construction atop a radically different reality?
This might seem a hard question to answer. I don't have an answer. But I do have a thought about a way in. My thought is this.
Suppose it's the case that there are multiple different ways of veridically visually experiencing the same object, so that we can't say "this way is right and this way is wrong" or "this way is preferred over this other way". And then suppose further that sometimes it is also the case that there is no good reason to think that one of those two experiences more closely resembles how the experienced object is in itself. From these suppositions, it would then seem to follow that there's a kind of looseness between the features of experience and the features of things in So my first question is: Are objects in the convex mirror closer than they appear?
Here are three possible answers:
(1.) Why yes, they are! (2.) No, objects in the mirror aren't closer than they appear; but that's because rather than being closer than they appear they are larger than they appear. The convex mirror distorts size rather than distance.
(3.) No, objects in the mirror aren't closer than they appear; nor are they larger than they appear; if you're a skilled driver, the car behind you, as seen with the aid of the convex passenger-side mirror, is just where it looks to be and just the size it looks to be. Back to our question: Are objects in the mirror closer than they appear? The third of the answers I gave above is the one I'm drawn to. That's the view that objects seen via the mirror are just the size and shape they appear to be. Maybe you will be drawn toward this view also?
Here are two reasons to favor the view. First, there seems no good reason to privilege saying that objects are closer than they appear in the convex mirror over saying that they are larger than they appear. It could be a 3-foot-tall car 30 feet away or a 6-foot-tall car 60 feet away. If we treat the convex mirror case as I'd like to, then it seems we can construct a garden path to the oar case, via intermediate cases such as hypothetical windshields that contain a refractive portion to allow a broader field of view, skilled spearfishers who never aim wrong, corrective eyeglasses that habitually slip down the nose, head-mounted cameras, etc. We could consider fish-eyed jewelers and sphere-eyed gods (Schwitzgebel 2012) . If would be elegant if we could treat all these cases in a unified way.
Inverting Lenses.
Let's consider another famous case, from the history of psychology, the case of the inverting lenses.
Inverting lenses were first tried by George Stratton in the late 19th century (1896, 1987a-c) . Stratton covered one eye and then presented to the other eye a field of view rotated 180 degrees, so that top was bottom and right was left. In his primary experiment, he wore this lens for the bulk of the day over the course of eight days, and he gives detailed introspective reports about his experience.
Stratton adapted to his inverting lenses, as do others who wear the lenses for an extended
period. But what does adapting consist in?
The simplest possibility to conceptualize, perhaps, is this: After adaptation, everything goes back to looking just the way it did before one donned the inverting lens. Let's say that preexperiment one looks out at the world -at, say, a lamp. Let's call the way things look, the way Schwitzgebel January 3, 2013 Known Illusion, p. 8 the lamp looks, before you put on the lens, "teavy". Now you put on the lens and everything seems to have rotated 180 degrees. Let's call that visual experience, that way the lamp looks to you now, "toovy". Over the course of adaptation, then, what happens on this view is that things go back -perhaps at first slowly, unstably, and disjointedly -to looking "teavy". After adaptation they look just the same way they would have looked if you had never donned the inverting lens in the first place. This is the way adaptation to inverting lenses is often described, for example by James Taylor 
